No one can know whether s(he) will be alive in August 2010. Certain events however are mathematically certain to take place. That certainty springs from our collective memory and the conclusions that accrue just on the basis of common sense and the simple study of recent history of the lands, the property and of the human lives that were lost.
So it is certain that
1. The State will not proceed with the necessary deep restructuring of the state apparatus so that it will effectively engage in (a) prevention of and (b) containment of the wildfire scheduled to occur in August 2010 in several spots of Attica and Biotia. That conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the wildfires of Ilia (Peloponnesus) (in which the worst destruction of wooded acreage, archaeological sites, property and highest toll of human lives took place). Due to the sheer magnitude of the calamity, the Government should have logically been forced into a spectacular institutional and structural response (changeovers of persons, changes in the legal frameworks, imposing of immediate reforestation, protection of the burned forest from encroachment and disappropriation, etc). Nothing like that happened. Whatever financial help was forwarded to the victims of the wildfires cannot possibly be compared to the benefits which would have accrued had there been a correct and effective prevention, applying a level of security and reconnaissance at a cost of only a small fraction of the security cost of the 2004 Olympic Games. The present wildfire in Attica proves that since the state apparatus was not effectively restructured in reaction and in response to the terrible defeat of the state in the eyes of its citizens, it is not going to respond now, either, in the wake of the second tragic betrayal of the state to its citizens. Therefore, in August 2010, whether we are alive or not, a wildfire will devastate whatever was left, and the distraught people will rush again to put out the fires that the Government that they again have voted to power is actually coldly indifferent about (apart from the undisputed localized heroism of particular people, i.e, fire-fighters, airmen, citizens, soldiers that will certainly take place again). More specifically,
2. August 2010 will again find a State which will still not have created the legal framework for the deterrence (due to simple fear of the consequences) of the aspiring amateur and professional arsonists. More particularly, in the period of 1999-2005 1,339 persons were convicted of deliberate arson (Onisenko, Kathimerini 23-08-09), of whom one third are parole violators, who in other words get an additional conviction for committing the same crime at least for the second time. 99% of the convicted were sentenced to 1-5 years imprisonment. Of these convictions two thirds were released on a 3-year parole and the rest one third were able to convert their conviction to a fine. So, even in the case that the arsonists do get caught, it is of little concern to them whether they will be convicted or not, since the legal framework is such that aids and abets their blatant recourse to the particular crime. Also, most of those brought in for questioning by the police on charges of arson, are subsequently released because of “insufficient and neglectful collection of evidence” (Onisenko, Kathimerini 23-08-09). Therefore, the August 2010 arsonists do not have much to fear. The State knows who they are (since at least one third of the convicted are parole breakers, and since the police keep records of those brought in for questioning, despite their subsequent release). Thus, police know where they come from, and so the commonsensical mind (and not one of Hercule Poirot) simply states that the police could keep a watch on them due to their criminal past, if nothing else. The fact that the police do no such thing (as results show) proves that there is practically no obstacle of fear for the August 2010 arsonists.
3. The Government is not going to outfit its fire-fighting air support units with (brand new) firefighting planes or helicopters, and so in August 2010 we will (again) watch the 30-year old familiar yellow and red (overused) Canadairs and the (more recent) helicopters. It is really curious how and why the fire-fighting defence of the country is still dependent on the technologically obsolete firefighting planes of the 1970s and 1980s while it could arm itself with state-of-the art firefighter planes which perhaps allowed for night operations as well. It is known that there commercially available helicopters armed with specific night-vision radars capable of monitoring the fire and broadcasting in real time air pictures either to land firefighting forces or to other planes concerning the progress of the wildfire and the prevention of its expansion (see for example AH-1 Firewatch “Cobra”). There are also other, similarly specialized aircraft akin to Canadair (see for example Grumman S-2T). The argument here is that if the available fleet were two or three times as big as the currently available one, the coordinated attacks (blitz) of, say, 10 aircraft on a single spot of fire, would most certainly put it out (if only all 10 of them attacked the same target in consecutive 2-3 minute interval) fast so that they could go and help somewhere else. One does not need to be an air command strategist to know just by the study of history alone, that the operational readiness, reaction time and effectiveness of any air power is a combined function of human capacity and training, aircraft specifications and their number. Thus, in the beginning of the Battle of England, the German aces were practically invincible. Yet, as soon as the English developed the Spitfire as an effective counterattack pursuer plane against the Messerschmitt Bf 109 in adequate numbers, aided by the fact that the Germans could no longer replace their fallen aces or their planes at the same rate as the English, sheer number became the critical factor in the equation of effectiveness. Against a wildfire which is both predictable (summertime) and also manageable (despite the “strategist wind”) which, therefore, also allows for at least one year preparation (from August till next August), albeit the wildfires occurring all year round, there is no excuse as to why the number of firefighting planes does not increase spectacularly. Whatever the cost of purchase, it cannot possibly be comparable to the cost of just a single F-16 fully-armed jet fighter or a new generation Leopard tank, or even the cost of certain projectiles or bombs. Such a cost could have presumably been prohibitive for countries or provinces, such as Ontario or Manitoba of Canada, the Provincial Governments of whom do not have a defence budget. Greece however forces its citizens to sustain a humongous percentage of the national budget on defence and armaments. It is therefore clearly a question of redefining what exactly is “defence expenditure”, and whether a small percent of this should be redirected so that Greece can boast, at last, that it has committed itself to the “purchase of the century” but in firefighting planes and equipment. The difference lies in that our war jet fighters are used the least and only during exercises (in intercept and deny-flight missions or in parades), while firefighter planes are fully operational (in analogous “war” conditions). This does not mean that we should abandon our defence programs, but this is a completely different issue. It still the case however that with some re-definition, there would be enough funds to solve the problem of wildfire protection for Greece. In fact Greece (prior of course to having all its forests devastated) could export firefighting services and knowhow to other neighboring countries without itself having to resort to agencies like Scorpion to hire for the season mainly Russian firefighting aircraft at very steep rates. Chances are then that no increase of the civil protection budget funds is going to occur and so in August 2010, we shall see again that small fleet engage itself in a difficult battle when such battle could have been cut to half or to a third.
4. The Government is not going to change the network responsible for the land encroachments and disappropriations, a network inclusive of local State urban planning offices, local notaries, the forestry service and particular localized interests (extremely powerful as one can surmise). Government has yet (!) to set up a national land registry 2 years after the 2007 wildfires. According to Karavellas (Kathimerini 23-08-09) the State has still not comprised a comprehensive damages report two years after the 2007 wildfires. As he puts it “there has been no actual improvement of the national protection and administration plan. Forestry Service is still in decline, while the operational readiness of the Fire Department remains problematic, with serious lack in personnel, equipment and know-how. For the critical issue of fire prevention via the ecological forestry administration, no consequential concern has been shown. Civil protection program remains ineffective. The volunteer organization registry has not been completed yet, and no measures have been taken for the training and qualification of volunteer group personnel, plus the fact that the few and far between state subsidies are given out indiscriminately without specific criteria”. Perhaps the single most important piece of accusation he makes, via WWF, is that the State has suspended the procedure of levying fines for the encroachment of forested land (!). In the same logic, Kouris, forester-environmental specialist (Kathimerini 23-08-09) argues that theoretically, there is very strong legislation (Law 998/79) that enforces the automatic reforestation of whichever national forest land gets destroyed. However, “the aspiring encroachers cause fires either with a view of exploiting those burned lands, or, and despite of their knowing the law, again set them alight in order to exploit them illegally by blatant disregard of the law”. So, in August 2010, with the aiding and abetting of the Government itself (of whichever party will be then in power) the whole charade (with a lot of help and sympathy of all the media) will be acted out again and the play will be re-enacted for us to watch: The Prime minister (whoever that might be) a little dishevelled, certainly not wearing a tie, perhaps in fatigues, will appear attentive with wide-eyed to whatever the (unwrinkled, coolly composed) top brass will be telling him “about the way things appear to go”. Then, the Prime minister will publicly declare that the struggle is a tough one, etc., etc., the heroism displayed, etc., etc., the self-sacrifice, etc., etc. Then, he will assume an angry/austere style, and will hurl threats at all arsonists – about whom he knows he does not really wish to punish – being complacent about the real culprits – including himself, since he is the top man. He only knows too well that if he plays his cards right (wearing the “right” face and countenance), with a little help from his staff, plus that from the fair and objective media in this country, he will survive the crisis and indeed he even might get away with an improvement of his image in the process. A recent reading of Greek history teaches us the Prime minister Karamanlis’ image was in fact augmented during the 2007 wildfires (as well as that of Voulgarakis, then Minister of Civilization) winning the votes of even the wildfire victims (!). Hence, in August 2010, everybody, except the people, will win something out of the crises and wildfires.
5. Government have no intention of actually showing any feeling for the country. On the contrary, they will continue to hurt it and inflict multiple damage on it. This heartlessness (I deliberately use a simple but very descriptive and emotionally loaded popular noun) is reflected not only in its substantive neglect about the consequences of wildfire destruction but also on a heap of other issues. Some of these are: the total lack of provision for any natural disaster (be it quakes, floods or wildfires), the dampening of the national pride in the management of national issues (apart from the athletic events), its total disregard for the actual level of destitution of the people (as shown by the logic of its taxation, always and consistently from bottom-up, rather than the other way around), total disregard for the existence of clientelistic and suspect interests which are always declared as the “real and present enemy” (in every electoral campaign) but which in practice prove “the real and present friend and helper”, the corruption of the people and of the youth in the logic and mentality of caring for only the ephemeral and strictly personal interest. Articulating that mentality, the State “produces” individuals who have a proclivity for unscrupulousness and social selfishness, potentially capable of undermining the nexus of social structure and norms. These people either systematically subvert or simply could not care less for the ill-functioning of state apparatus (seen at once if present standards of operation are contrasted to the charter-specified obligations to the citizens), until of course its inefficiency hits them on the head personally. Thus, their ephemeral, short-term and short-sighted personal interest destroys the state apparatus, destroying themselves in the process, precisely as a cancerous cell finally eats away at the very organism that allowed it to exist and multiply in the first place.
If up until now, we bear witness to an institutionalization of the unethical, the illogical, the illegal, of the toleration, the aiding and abetting and of the State’s complacence, what guarantees can we possibly have that any of these will change so that next August 2010 will not witness the same events? None whatsoever. See you then all in the foretold and premeditated crime of August 2010. With one critical difference: It is up to us not to let that happen to us again. First, through our vote, which should neither forget, forgive or be self-blinding. This means that if there is no one that deserves it, no one is going to get it; Second, by means of our critical thinking, allowing it to judge rationally that the interest of the many is the interest of the single individual; Third, by means of our love for the country and the nation, our only guarantee that Greece lives in us all and guides our actions.
London, August 2009
Michael Tzanakis, Sociologist